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1Lconoraic Determinants of the iransfer of /rrns 
and mlitary lechnology under the irench fifth Republic
Lconomic considerations have had a powerful and pervaoive 
influence on rrench fifth Republic policy toward the transfer of 
arms and military technology ihese may be seen to have evolved 
through two stages of development, conforming to two conceptually 
distinguishable but operationally intertwined economic rationales 
for selling arms lhe first period extends roughly from the 
inception of the fifth Republic in 19bb until the internal 
upheavals of hay I960 when the regime was almost overthrown 
During this initial phase, the economic rationale for foreign 
military sales accented the search for ways to cut the costs of 
arms production, research, and development Arms sales were 
viewed as a means to lighten the burden of defense expenditures 
aid to meet the demand of lrench military forces for adequate 
levels of suitable arras
ihe second phase, commenced with the Pompidou administration 
m  196S, continues until the present emphasis is placed on 
transferring arras and technology as a contribution to public 
welfare Cost cutting measures, such as joint programs with 
other countries to develop new arms, are still vigorously pursued 
but these efforts are promoted within a larger policy framework 
that seeks, simultaneously, to respond to domestic economic 
imperatives through the sale of arms and technology to other 
states, particularly those in the developing world Data are 
presented below to suggest the economic importance of arms 
transfers for the trench economy Ihey also provide a significant
part of the explanation for why french arms sales behavior has not 
appreciably changed despite the election m  19bl of a Socialist 
government and president, who had previously expressed serious 
reservations about rrance's position as the world’s third most 
important arms supplier ^
Since the late 1960s, 1 ranee has been the foremost supplier 
of arms and military technology alter tnc superpowers successive 
tifth Republic regimes on the Right and Leit have evidenced no 
serious interest, aside from periodic disclaimers, oí 
relinquishing rrance’s current position to other states 2 
Since 1960, tranee has transferred weapons and production 
know-how, covering all major categories of arms for ground, sea, 
and air forces to over 100 states around the world in annual 
current prices, the total value of 1 rench arras and military 
technology that has been delivered abroad between 19/0 and 19Ö0 
is estimated at »^2:6 billion J Orders for new arms contracts 
reached a record total of $6 8 billion in I9 0O ** xhis 
impressive level of effort reflects a shared view by all fifth 
Republic governments that the transfer of arms and technology is 
a critical component of an over-all strategy to modernize the 
French economy and to sustain full employment (particularly in 
sectors of advanced technology), economic growth, and 1 ranee’s inter­
national competitive position, defined m  terms of balance of payments 
equilibrium, the development of a global market for 1 rench goods, 
and access to raw materials, especially oil
I  LCOhOlilC STAGES Of ARMS 1 RAivSFLR GROWTH 
ÜULU pk C-Q31s and „Maintaining Demand
ihe production of arms and the development oí a large and 
complex defense industry in ' ranee after World War il were, and 
still are, responses to perceived external threats and security 
imperatives Successive governments under the bourth and i ifth
Republic have viewed trance’s autonomous capacity to make and 
develop arms as an indispensable requirement to assure its 
political independence and national security  ^ General accord 
on this requirement has been translated into a long-term 
commitment to construct a broadly based arras industry capable of 
furnishing, with some notable exceptions like air defense and 
battlefield control equipment, almost all of the arms and related
support equipment needed by trench armed forces these range 
from light arms and armor to combat vessels and supersonic 
aircraft lhey also include nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems Ihe decision to maintain a military-industrial complex 
to meet trance’s security needs implies a major commitment of 
economic resources which are not easily shouldered by a middle 
range power The ability of the French economy to maintain such a 
complex industrial system at full employment is limited On the
other hand, for many weapons and weapon systems
trance’s productive capacity exceeds the military requirements of 
its armed services ihe government could absorb the arras that 
its industry can produce, but only at a prohibitive cost to 
other governmental services and public welfare Ihe introduction 
of five-year defense planning and budget cycles, begun in I960, 
was designed to rationalize defense spending partly in terms of 
these broad resource parameters while assuring a steady flow of
4financial support for the equipment and modernization of trance's 
armed forces  ^ Limits have had to be set, therefore, on the 
amount of resources that would be devoted to defense spending 
internal demand for arms, consequently has persistently fallen 
below full employment m  the defense industry lí rifth Republic 
defense expenditures have avoided the penurie and oscillations of 
the defense spending characterizing the iourth Republic, it has 
until recently devoted a steadily decreasing amount ol GhP and 
governmental spending to defense oetween 1900 and 19/6 defense 
expenditures as a percent of GNP have fallen each year from a 
high of 6 2 percent of GNP in I960, at the height of the Algerian 
war, to a low of i 4 percent in the three years immediately 
following the oil crisis of 197o lhe quadrupling of oil prices 
in the aftermath of the lorn hippur war placed a great strain on 
governmental spending Defense, along with other sectors of the 
budget, had to absorb cuts to keep public spending under control 
and resist major inflationary pressures Only with the 
initiation of the fourth defense law-program m  19/7 has the 
percent of defense spending as a percent of GNP gone up it has 
slowly climbed from d 4 m  the middle 19/Os to j (l of GRP by 19Ö0 
and may yet reach a targeted level of 4 percent
Defense spending as a percent of governmental spending has 
clearly fallen below early prognostications ihese were to rise 
to 20 percent by the end of the fourth defense budget cycle in 
19Ö2, but they have essentially stagnated since the Day events of 
I960 Defense expenditures as a percent of governmental spending 
have changed very little between 1969 and I960, ranging from a
high of 1/ o percent in 1969 to a low oí 16 6 percent in 19/9--U 
difference of only one point— despite tne announced coramiImeni of 
the Giscard d'cstaing government to increase defense 
expenditures between I960 and I960, GhP and overall 
governmental spending have roughly increased ten-fold based on 
1959 prices, defense spending has increased only by a little more 
than half as much during the same period  ^ ihese trends m  
defense spending as percentage of GWP and central governmental 
expenditures are traced in iigure 1
ihe problem of sustaining sufficient internal demand for 
indigenously produced arras was complicated further by two other 
policy decisions fhe first was the priority given to the 
development of a nuclear force Lven before the Algerian war was 
liquidated, an increasing proportion of the procurement portion 
of the defense budget was reserved for nuclear arms and delivery 
systems Programs were established to develop atomic bombs of 
kiloton yields approximately three-times the size of the 
Hiroshima explosion, to produce of iirage IV aircraft to deliver 
tnese weapons, to build an isotope separation plant at 
Pierrelatte to facilitate production of thermonuclear weapons, 
and to plan for tne construction of a land-based deterrent 
composed of intermediate range missiles Spending for nuclear 
arms, as Figure ¿ notes, climbed rapidly to more than 50 percent 
of French procurement in 196/, before levelling off at 
approximately one-third of equipment and capital purchases during 
the 19/Os Ihe significance of this level of expenditure for 
nuclear arms is that procurement of nonnuclear arms and equipment
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TABU 3
FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET WITH SELLCTED COMPONENTS 
FOR PROCUREMENT AND PERSONNEL, AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GOVERNMENTAL 
SPENDING AND GNP 
1960-1980
(in billions of dollars)
Defense Budget
Governmental /
Year
Total
(initial)
Procure­
ment ¿ Personnel ¿
Total
Budget
of Total 
BudgeL GNP / of GNP
1960 3 35 1 21 36 2 2 14 63 8 11 75 28 5 54 03 6 2
1961 3 41 1 15 33 8 2 26 66 2 12 72 26 8 58 79 5 8
1962 3 50 1 17 33 5 2 33 66 5 14 17 24 7 64 81 5 4
1963 3 76 1 57 41 8 2 19 58 2 15 73 23 9 73 73 5 1
1964 4 02 1 84 45 7 2 18 54 3 17 48 23 0 82 04 4 9
1965 4 21 2 11 50 1 2 10 49 9 18 71 22 5 8/ /I 4 8
1966 4 46 2 28 51 2 2 18 48 8 20 46 21 8 94 89 4 /
1967 4 77 2 49 52 2 2 28 47 8 23 04 20 7 103 70 4 6
1968 5 06 2 53 50 0 2 53 50 0 25 17 20 1 110 00 4 6
1969 5 08 2 49 49 0 2 59 51 0 28 54 17 8 120 95 4 2
1970 4 90 2 31 47 1 2 59 52 9 27 84 17 6 125 64 J 9
1971 5 21 2 37 45 5 2 84 54 5 29 11 17 9 140 81 3 7
1972 6 17 2 83 45 8 3 34 54 2 34 86 17 7 171 39 3 6
1973 7 81 3 58 45 8 4 23 54 2 44 12 17 7 223 14 3 5
1974 7 95 3 55 44 7 4 40 55 3 45 69 17 4 233 82 3 4
1975 10 22 4 45 43 5 5 77 56 5 60 47 16 9 300 59 3 4
1976 10 46 4 38 41 9 6 08 58 1 61 17 17 1 307 65 3 4
1977 11 89 4 87 41 0 7 02 59 0 68 33 17 4 330 28 3 6
19/8 14 99 6 31 42 1 8 68 57 9 88 70 16 9 416 39 3 6
1979 18 12 7 83 43 2 10 29 56 8 107 86 16 8 489 73 3 7
1980 20 97 9 44 45 0 11 53 55 0 124 08 16 9 551 84 3 8
Sources Cor Ligure 1 There is considerable variation amont lreneh oJliei il 
sources and those of other national and international agene lcs with lcs|>«_c l 
to Trench spending on defense the division of expenditures between peLsonnU 
and capital purchases, the total of cenLial governmental spending and i Nl 
Compare, for example, these differences m  Trench official sources ovcl i 
period of five years France, Assemblée Nationale Commission de la Odieuse 
Nationale et des Forces Armées (1977), Avis sur le projet d_e__loi_ dt._j.in mees 
pour 1978 No 3150, Défense Dépenses en capital pp 13-1/ irtCo"UUJ ss 10,1
des Tinance (1979), Rapport sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1980 No 
1292 Défense Considérations Générales pp 27 81, 108-110 1 Lance ScnaL 
Commission des Tmanees (1980) Rapport Général Défense No 98 p / and 
France, MinisLcre de Defense SIRPA Le budgbt de 11 défense nitioinl pout 
1981 (Paris, 1981) pp 5-7 Defense expenditures are taken fi om Rapport 
Ño 1292 (1979), p 81 the percentage division bcLwccn personnel and capital 
expenditures for 1960-1974 is drawn from Ayos, No 3150 (19//) P 17 (initiil 
budget figures) and from SIRPA, Le ttudgÒL de la dCl eiv>e
for 19/5-1980 Central governmental expenditures percentages ire taken 
from Avis No 3150 (1977), p 16 (initial budget figures) for 1960-19/4 and 
from Ñérvat, Rapport, No 98 (1980), p 7, for 1975-1980 Percent ige of CNP 
spenL on defense calculated in terms of the defense budget, is based on 
Sénat Rapport.No 98 (1980), p 7, for 1960-1980 Percentages uc rounded 
lo nearest one-tenth of one percent
Exchange rates are taken from International Monetary lund Inter 
Financial Statistics 1977, XXI, No 5 (May, 1977), pp 166-167 and idem Miy 
1981 pp 152 Note discrepancies between IMF figures for GNP md Lhosi 
deriving from Trench parliamentary sources which are lower i he dilluenets 
are partly due to the different base on which GNP is calculated ihc 
parliamentary reports depend on calculations for produit intéricui 
a formula that generally leads to lower estimates of internal gioss n i u o m J
product
Note also that oscillations in the percentage increase in Lhe budget 
are partly due to the rate of inflation in Trance and the shifting exchange 
rate, expressed in dollars Tor example, between 1969 and 1970, defense 
spending (crédit de paiements) increased from 26 4 to 27 19 billion francs 
However the rate of the franc declined relative to the dollar and therefore 
the dollar value of defense spending is shown to have fallen Ihis distorted 
effect becomes especially acute after 1981 because of the devaluation of 
the Trench franc
These French sources conflict with other open literature souices tor 
Trench defense spending, GNP, and central governmental expenditures Compare 
with U S , Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Lxpenditu | 
and Arms Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington Government Printing Office, 19B¿), 
p 38, International Institute for Strategic Scudics, Military 
1982-1983 (London 1982) p 124 and SIPR1 W<or U _ A r » ^ C £ t s _ j ^ M ^ s ^ ^ c n t s  
Yearbook 1982 (London laylor and 1 rancis 1982), p 150 these la 
three sources generally cite higher ratios for defense spending relati e 
to GNP and central governmental expenditures Lhan does the Trench Minis y 
of Defense or parliamentary reports
Tor an alternative calculation of defense spending estimates from 194a-1976, 
sec Michel m u î T  M ....... ..... Fstablishment Since
1945 (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina, 1981), p ->
Sources Cor Tigure 2 Trance, Assemblée Matronale Commission de la Del case 
Nationale et des Forces Armees (1977), Avis sur le projet de loi de 
finances pour 1978, No 3150, Deferì c Depenses en Capital, pp 22-2J 
Idem, Commission des Tinances (1978) Rapport sur le projet de loi de 
finances pour 1979, No 570 Considerations Génerales et Dépenses ca 
Capital p 84, and idem Commission des Tinances (1979), RapporL sur 
le projet de loi de finances pour 1980 No 1292 Defense Depenses 
en Capital, p 22
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Sources for ligure 2 Trance, Assemblée Nationale Commission du La
Défense Nationale et des Forces Arnees (1979) Avis sur le projci 
de loi de finances pour 1978, No 31a0 Défense Dépenses en 
Capital, pp 22-23
Idem, Commission des 1 manees (1978) Rapport sur le projet de 
loi de finanees pour 1979, No 570 Considérations Céndrales 
et Dépenses en Capital, p 84 and idem Commission des Tinances 
(1979), Rapport sur le proiet de loi de finances pour 1980 No 1292 
Défense Dépenses en Capital p 22
ihere are discrepaneies m  irendi pailiamenLaiy repoiLs nul Ministry 
of Defense figures on all items covered in Figure 1 Parliamentary 
reports were principally relied upon although allocations for pro­
curement and personnel within the defense budget for 1976-1980 were 
drawn from Ministry of Defense figures These Trench sources 
conflict with other open literature sources for defense spending 
GNP, and central governmental expenditures Compare with U S , Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1970-1979 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1982), 
p 38 International Institute foi Strategic Studies Mil 11 iry 
1982-1983 (London, 1982) p 124 ind S1PR1 World ArnnmenLs uul 
Djsarmaments Yearbook 1982 (London 1 lylor nnd Irmeis 1982) p 
150 ihese latter three sources cite higher raLios for defense 
spending relative to GNP and central governmental expenditures Lh m  
does the French Ministry of Defense or parliamentary reports
owas neglected Purchase of conventional arms was arrestee at the 
very time that french strategy was calling for a fundamental 
reorganisation and modernisation oi trench armed iorces in the 
wake of the momentous decision to abandon a century-old policy of 
colonial empire in favor of a nuclear deterrent posture lo 
maintain efficient arms production, orders for nonnuclear arms 
had to be sought abroad to compensate for lagging domestic demand 
for conventional arms and the priority assigned to nuclear 
weapons, which would not be sold to foreign governments for 
reasons of national security
Adding to the difficulty of sustaining sufiicient demand to 
keep iranee's arms industry at efficient levels of operation wa*, 
the domestic upheaval oí the late l^oOs, commencing with the hay 
riots of 1^6o ihey forced the de Gaulle and, later, the 
Pompidou governments to allocate not only more resources for 
civilian welfare programs, symbolized by the Grenoble accords of 
spring l^bd to increase worker wages, but also to shift 
priorities within the rrench budget in favor of spending on 
personnel, that is, military welfare at the expense again of 
military procurement, particularly nonnuclear weapons
ihese varied constraints— decreasing defense spending as a 
percent of GNP and governmental expenditures, the priority 
assigned to nuclear weapons, and the demand of the public and 
defense forces for more spending on civilian and military 
welfare— set m  train pressures to reconcile these broad welfare 
imperatives with perceived security needs by increasing the 
amount and the sophistication of arms and technology sold abroad
Itìy the late 1950s, trance rose to third place among arms 
suppliers Its rise was indirectly fostered by the preoccupation 
elsewhere of its potential competitors United States arms 
production was fully concentrated on meeting the demands of tne 
Vietnamese war Under tne Labor government Great britain 
temporized for almost a decaoe over the decision whetner to 
follow trance's decision to pursue au aggressive arms sales 
program abroad West Germany and uapan, as defeated powers and 
tied to U S military policy, faced political and 
psychological barriers m  responding to rising global demand for 
arms besides, they were so successful in penetrating foreign 
civilian markets that they were little concerned with the search 
for arm outlets ihe elite corps within the Delegation 
Generale pour l ’Armement, responsible for directing trance's 
arms industry, developed a global market network to sell arms  ^
Within the DGP the Direction Internationale, charged with 
overseeing the process by which arms sales are authorized, also 
assumed tne role as trance's foremost agent to discover, develop, 
and promote arms sales abroad trench diplomatic missions 
stationed in countries around the world were enlisted into the 
sales service A large specialized technical office was 
established in Washington to assist potential arms clients 
Government corporations were established to promote arms sales 
Advantageous credit arrangements, often at concessionary rates, 
were made available through such organizations like COtACu to 
facilitate arms contracts ihese wide-ranging efforts were given
official sanction in the only white paper issued on defense
policy under the tifth Republic increased arras sales were 
justified m  the name of economic efficiency
One has already noted the advantages of exports a better 
balance of production scheduling an increase of quantities 
produced, and therefore a spreading of fixed costs over 
longer series runs y
These general economic consideration^ have been extended to 
the development of joint research, development, and production 
arrangements with other arms producers ouch programs have also 
been viewed as a way to lower the overall national costs of 
developing new systems with other states, to keep pace with 
innovation m  military technology, and to create ready-made 
markets for arms through guaranteed arras purchases by the 
cooperating states xhese incentives have proved powerful enough 
to overcome the recluctance of french governments which have 
uniformly preferred national, autonomous development of weapons 
over cooperation with other states l rench rhetoric is a 
misleading predictor of L rench arms production behavior On a 
pragmatic, weapons-by-weapons basis, Trance nas signed more 
contracts to promote specific arms projects of interest to trench 
armed forces than any other country ihese have been pursued 
principally with other European states, esoecially West Germany 
and Great Britain trance has also joined the Independent 
European Programs Group (i l PG) within the Atlantic Alliance in 
order to promote joint weapons development, although it still 
refuses to return to NATO or participate in the Eurogroup, whose 
aim is to define European interests within the alliance
table 1 summarizes the major weapons programs that have been
lABLE 1
SELECTED JOINT MILIlARY DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION 
BETWELN PRANCE AND OTHLR TUROPEAN STAILS
PROGRAM
COOPERATING
NATIONS
CONTRACTED OR 
START Or STUDY
I Aircraft
Atlantique naval West
patrol aircraft Germany (G)
Great Britain (GB) 
Belgium (B), 
Netherlands(N)
Transall ^
Jaguar dual purpose GB
training and attack \
aircraft (various 
models)
Alpha-Jet trainer G
II Helicopters
Puma? Gß
Gazelle GB
Lynx GB
III Missiles3
Martel ASM anti- GB
radar (AS 37) TV- 
guided version(AJ168)
Milan G
anti-tank missile (mid-range) 
Hot anti-tank (long-range)
Roland I (clear 
weather and II 
(all weather)SAM
Otomat (SSM,ASM) 
(Several successive 
versions)
Hawk SAM missile^
G
Italy (I)
I, G, B, N
IV Ground Equipment
Ratac, radar conto Lied G
artillery
Rita, communications B
system
1960
1959
1964
1969
196/
1967
1967
1963
1964
1964
1964
1969
1960
PROGRAMS
SLRVICL
Navy/Air lorce
Air lorce 
Air lorce
Air lorce
Air lore»-/Army 
Air Torce/Army 
Air torce/Army
Air Torce/Navy
Army
Army
Army
Navy
Army
Army
Army
TABLE 1 (continued)
Argus, observation G
plaLform
V Naval Vessels
Mine Sweeper B,N
Army
Navy
Source Various sources have been consulted Most important is the annual
review of world armaments, issued by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament The jyPRI 
Yearbook, 1962-1980, Jane's All the World's Aircraft (London MacDon ild 
1959-75), Defense Marketing Systems, Foreign Military Markets, 1 rance 
(Greenwich, Conn ), and France, Assemblée Nationale, Commission de li 
Defense Nationale et des Forces Armees (1974), Avis sur le projet de 
loi de finances pour 1975, Défense Dépenses en capital, No 1233 
PP 93-96 and idem (1981) Avis Defense Politique de défi nsi 
de la 1 ranee, No 4/3 pp 122-123
1 ilie sources are not always clear on ihcsc Lwo poinLs, i e whelhei a signed 
accord signifies an immediate start of a program
2 Design is Trench, production essentially licensed by France to Gre*t ßriidiu
3 Exocet air-to-surface and surface-to-surface naval missiles developed by 
French with financial support from Great Britain
4 Licensed for the United States under NATO arrangements
undertaken under the fifth Republic with other states Listed 
are the specific weapons programs, cooperating nations, com­
mencement aates, and armed services for which the weapons were 
intended lhe list is confined to projects for joint design, 
development, and production mese are distinguished from 
contracts to transfer military technology, know-how, production 
services, and equipment to arras recipients as part of iranee's 
military sales activity fhese elements now bulk larger in 
trench sales contracts than a decade ago, as weapons recipients 
insist increasingly,m  their purchase of arms, on access to 
weapons design, production, licenses, and technical assistance to 
build their own arms complexes
ihe same pragmatic attitude characterizing Irench acceptance 
of the principle of international cooperation m  developing 
weapons has carried over to the creation of organizational 
mechanisms m  contract execution In some cases, separate 
corporate structures have been established lhese include 
L-HTpmissile (Aérospatiale and nesser s chmi tt-bolkow-blohm, or 
,bu)> SQ,9lgtS Cviropgenne dS Production de 1 'Avion hoole de Combat.
— £-ß.Pül— LflÇt?iQUg, (or Sc.Pt.CAl, composed of Dassault-Breguet and 
Lntish Aircraft Corporation! and Société européenne de 
iCJ/iftUldage (or ouiuL, forming a Luropean consortium under the 
leadership of ihomson-Houston) bilateral arrangements have also 
been utilized lhese include accords between üassault-Bréguet and 
uornier to build the Alpha jet, between i atra and british and 
Italian firms to develop tactical missiles, and between 
Aerospatiale and iurboméca and several British firms to produce
the Lynx, Puma, ana Gazelle nelicopters fool without some irony 
the British government contributed one-sixth of the cost oí 
developing the exocet missile, a trench version of which was 
successfully employed against the British fleet m  the [alklands 
Island war Eesides these established programs iranee is also 
currently pursuing cooperative research on at lca^t nine other 
weapons systems with West Germany, Great Britain and the United 
States 10
Arms Supply and Welfare
rranee entered a new arms marketing phase m  ly/Os ihe 
shift was gradual and imperceptible at first m  the first phase, 
as suggested above, pressures were felt to produce and sell arms 
to lower the burden of the defense budget and the high fixed coots 
of maintaining a large and complex arms system lhese pressures 
focused on several economic targets at the same time large 
series runs to cut unit costs, full employment of productive 
resources, the expansion and periodic modernization of the 
nation's arms production base, and foreign support for research 
and development in this initial phase concern focuses on the 
effective utilization of largely fixed factors of production to 
furnish arms required by national forces Gales abroad maintain 
demand for weapons at levels approaching ft.11 and efficient 
employment of productive resources
As the Lrench arms industry has matured and as it has 
successfully developed a global market for its products, arm3 are 
treated like any other good or service that can be exchanged to 
benefit public ana private welfare Considerations that loom
large in this phase are concern for the state's balance of 
payments position, the price of weapons and terms oí 
international trade and competition, access to markets and raw 
materials, creation of new markets for the sale of arras, product 
leadership m  arras sales to penetrate civilian markets, economic 
growth, and investment opportunities
ihe economic benefits of arms transfers are seen ao sources 
of socio-political stability in this light, the sale of arms and 
technology abroad assumes a life of its own, progressively 
detached from the foreign policy and strategic objectives that 
initially prompted the decision to develop weapons indigenously 
Under this guise arms are no longer toolo of national defense but 
commodities in international trade and instruments of economic 
growth and social harmony Previous concerns with sustaining 
demand and cutting costs are not abandoned or necessarily 
neglected Rather, they are overtaken by commercial, public 
welfare and private profit motives that drive the sale of 
military arras and technology forward Claims are made, 
furthermore, that the production and sale of arms have civilian 
spin-offs that create new employment and foreign markets ihe 
choice traditionally posed Detween defense spending (guns) and 
public welfare (butter) is transformed wo longer is emphasis 
placed on selling a* ms abroad to relax this tension between guns 
and butter ihis phrasing of tne problem, which underlay the 
initial development of the french arms industry to roughly the 
end of the 1960s, has been recast m  the form of public welfare 
because of arms, that is, more butter because of guns
Socialist lamster Charles Hernu captured much of the spirit
of this welfare orientation to arms sales in an interview given 
to Le q g a r o  in September, iyo¿
Charles Hernu i am always surprised when people talk 
about arms sales m  that reproacnful tone People 
forget that the defense minister is not only responsible 
for military personnel Out of /20,000 people who work 
for the Defense i mxstry there arc 1*4.3,000 civilian^ 
and 90,000 arsenal workers In addition, there are the 
armamenlo enterprises--the National Aerospace induotry 
Company, lhomson-CSi, Dassault, Renault industrial 
Vehicles, Panhard and the Samt-ctienne Arms Company 
employ 300,000 workers and engineers As for 
subcontracting, do you know how many it employs/ One 
million1
Christine Clerc ihose figures are all very convincing, 
but why were they ignored for so long' in opposition, 
íierre uauroy expressed indignation that lranee had 
become the third biggest arms exporter in the world 
And yet we have advanced
Charles hernu 1 would like to remind you of the arras 
industries' contribution to research Do you know that 
we are the envy of the Americans m  the sphere of 
lasers, carbon fibers, and the detection of submarines 
and nuclear weapons' Do you know that lhorason-CSi is 
one of the world's leading exporters of advanced 
military technology Do you know that we are making 
great strides in research on infra-red night sights/ At 
the 14 July parade nobody noticed that the helicopters 
were flying at night However, that is a considerable 
advance
Christine Clerc What about you' Did you know all that 
before you took office'
Charles Hernu No As mayor of Villeurbanne 1 was 
unaware that there wa3 a factory m  ray own city 
manufacturing carbon fiber elements *
Table 2 provides evidence for the view at the sale of arms and
military technology nave become a critical component of lrench 
economic activity Proposals to check or reduce such sales imply, at
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Sources for Table 2 Tor 1970-1979, see 1 rance Assemblee Nationale, Commission 
des Finances (1980), Rapport sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1981 No 
1976, Défense Consideration Genérales— Dépenses en Capital, pp 196 lor 
1980, consult idem, Commission de la Defense Nationale et des lorces Armees 
(1981), Avis sur le proiet de loi de finances pour 1982 No A73 p 119 
and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, July, 
1982, pp 166-169 for export import figures» and exchange rates See also 
same source, May 1977, pp 166-169, for remaining exchange rates
Ileast in the short run, either the creition or discovery oi new 
outlets for goods and services m  the civilian sector to compensate 
for losses m  military sales or absorption of these losses m  business 
activity and employment for the sake of arms control and disarmament 
objectives Neither the announced policy of the Socialist government, 
noted above, nor the economic realities with which it must currently 
deal suggest that there will be any downturn m  the current level of 
arms transfers that have been achieved Lxports for ircnch products, 
including arms, have increased approximately 5t>0 percent between 19 fO 
and 19Ö0 Arms exports, meanwhile, have progressed at a rate of l^bO 
percent or more than twice as fast as civilian exports While exports 
in constant 19b9 francs have approximately doubled in the 19 ƒ Os, arms 
exports in the same period have quadrupled it should al^o be
noted that these exports largely arise m  advanced technology sectors 
Ihe value added to products for delivery abroad through indigenous 
production is, therefore, substantial it is precisely in these areas 
of major capital exports that trance has lagged behind its principal 
competitors m  the developed world, including the united States, 
oapan, West Germany, Great ontain, and Italy trench arms sales are 
a motor force of overall french exports and bulk large in deliveries 
of heavy equipment and advanced technology items
At this point in its industrial development trance enjoys a 
comparative advantage in military sales markets its commercial 
success is partly due to the lethality and effectiveness of its 
military products Ihese have been tested in several wars, including 
those m  South Asia (India and Pakistan), the uiddle Last (Israel and 
the Arab states and Iraq against Iran), and the south Atlantic
Urgentina and Great Britain) trench equipment is now found m  the
arsenals of rival combatants, as m  the case, for example, of Lxocet
missiles with respect to Argentina and ureat Britain
trance also enjoys several political advantages over its
competitors in selling arms and military technology first, unlike the
superpowers, its sale of arras does not immediately ensnare a client
into the web of entangling polltico-occur j. ty relations implied by
military assistance from the United States or the soviet Union ihe
irench are conscious of this position as an alternative to the
superpowers as supppliers ihe 19/2 white paper identified this
political factor as a critical determinant of Irench sales to
13developing states ihis view was re-ai firmed by the Socialist
minister of Defense Charles Hernu when he justified Íranee's liberal 
arms sales policy in terms reminiscent of classic Gaullist doctrine
Ought we to leave friendly nations alone in face of the 
two superpowers/ At present, when a country is armed by 
one of those two superpowers the neighboring country, if 
it feels threatened, immediately asks for arms from the 
other ihat opposition between the two blocs presents 
the most serious threat to world conflict So, yes, 1 
have a clear conscience when I sell arms to a country, 
if that prevents it from buying from one of the two 
superpowers
Second, the economic benefits of selling arms offset, if they 
do entirely negate, foreign policy and strategic objections and 
restrictions that might be effectively imposed While trance 
joined the U ùi embargo on arms to south Africa, these 
limitations did not extend to licensing accords with Pretoria for 
the production of weapons and parts that were signed before the 
embargo was set in place ihe sale of uirage aircraft to Libya 
in the early 19/Os was motivated largely by economic
Ib
considerations What restrictions were placed on Libyan transfer 
of these aircraft to third states were largely nullified when 
ïripoli sent some of these aircraft to Lgypt during the loin 
Mppur war The mneffectual response of the i rench government 
m  preventing these transfers signaled the high priority that 
trance attaches to its reputation as a reliable arms suppliers 
The vedette affair m  December 1969, when Israeli agents spirited 
patrol craft from Cherbourg despite an embargo against arras sales 
to Israel, illustrates further the weak political controls that 
are exercised over foreign governments when arras contracts are 
written or after weapons have already been purchased Ihere 
appeared to be more than coincidence, moreover, m  the timing of 
the lifting of the embargo in 19iM against middle Last countries 
which were "on the field of battle " Ihe trench action was taken 
at approximately the time that the Saudi Arabian government was 
m  the process of searching for suppliers to equip its ground 
forces in lifting this self-imposed limitation, trance was able 
to compete successfully for over a billion dollars m  ground arms 
contracts from Saudi Araoia and position itself for access to the 
Iraqi market It is difficult to determine how many sales 
trance has rejected on security or foreign policy grounds Israel 
did suffer after the June 196/ war when ilirage aircraft were 
impounded and an embargo was imposed Howovcr, the vedette 
affair and remarks by an important Gaullist parliamentarian that 
Israel eventually received spare parts for its Kirage aircraft 
reinforce the image of a trance bent more on selling arms than on 
restricting access to the trench arms market or on directing how
they must be used after delivery
finally, domestic opposition has been weak and scattered in 
opposing arras transfers Previous Socialist criticism has been 
stilled by the responsibilities of office On coming to oí fice 
Socialist Prime i mister Pierre liauroy explained that "trench 
policy aims for peace and detente Our country will, therefore, 
try world wide to curtail and moralize arms exports ' ^  these 
high hopes have since been oversnadowed by the Socialist 
government's approval of billions of dollars worth of arras 
contracts with foreign governments If some contracts with 
authoritarian regimes, like Chile and South Africa, have been 
annulled, foreign sales contracts remained essentially at the 
high le/el3 established m  the late 19(Qj it might also be 
noted that trance continues to supply South Africa with 
assistance in building a light water nuclear reactor which, 
conceivably, could aid Pretoria in developing nuclear weapons
i>rms exports also play an important role in meeting trench 
energy needs tven before the oil crisis of the mid-19/Os, 
rranee had already shown a concern for access to adequate oil 
resources and to the need tor dollar reserves to pay for its 
energy needs Approximately two-thirds of trance's energy needs 
depend on oil and over 90 percent of its requirements for oil 
must be filled by imports, principally from the Uiddle Last 
lhis poses a serious problem of reliable supplies at affordable 
prices lhe quadrupling of oil prices placed a heavy strain on 
the trench economy, fueling inflation and reducing the 
competitiveness of brench products in world markets Arms
1 (
transferred to the Arab states oí the t iddle Laot has been one oi
the major instruments by which to assure oil supplies and soaring
oil prices Official estimates of the geographic distribution of
arms deliveries are not available from trench sources in a form
to identify flows to specific regimes, like the Middle bast or
Black Africa Published data from official sources essentially
divide arras deliveries between developed and developing states
In the 19b0s, the balance was roughly divided between the two
trom the 1910s to the present, however, the bulk of trench arms
go to developing countries ihese have averaged well over 60
percent of trench arms exports and passed the 90 percent mark m  
1719b0 Of these, press and secondary sources indicate that 
the Middle aast is the major recipient tigures for 19Ö0 suggest 
the following division ^
Hi.
Middle uast(including
North Africa) 6
Latin America ( 0
bar Cast 2 Ö
slack Africa 2 à
Europe and North Pfrica ( 4
Other 1 ¿
Of deliveries to the Middle nasi Lgypt, Iraq, Laudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Lmirates have been the largest 
recipients of trench arms Excluding Lgypt, these three states 
are among franee's principal suppliers of oil As lable / 
reveals, arms deliveries as a percent of oil imports have ranged
from a low of 14 1 percent m  1974 to a high of ¿9 6 percent in 
197¿, a year before the first major oil crisis Ihey have been 
averaging approximately 25 percent of oil imports What is also 
important to recognize is that more arms must now be sold to 
maintain approximately the same percentage of energy coverage as 
a decade ago ihe irench arms industry has had to become more 
export oriented in order to contribute at the same level is it 
did before the oil crisis of the 1970s to rranee's energy 
solvency
The contribution made by arms deliveries to branee's 
financial solvency also should not be overlooked ¡able 2 above 
indicates that trance has run an overall trade deficit for the 
past decade Ihe imbalance has grown increasingly acute since 
the late 19/0s in the absence of arms sales, trance's deficits 
would have reached even higher proportions ln 19Ö0, for 
example, almost $6 billion dollars in new foreign market sales 
would have had to be found to compensate for the trade receipts 
attributable to arras and military technology Critics have a 
point when they charge that such civilian markets are available 
japan and West Germany are often cited as evidence for a 
re-allocation of productive resources While there may be 
considerable truth in this argument, it currently has had little 
weight in trench policy circles Lrench leaders must solve now 
trance's acute balance of payments problem Resources are lacking 
to mount tne kind of effort needed to reorient the defense 
industry Lven if these resources are conceivably available, a 
shift to civiliar investment and a shrinking of th arms industry
19
would necessitate serious transitional economic disruption and 
result m  high social and political costs that no Trench regime 
today could easily tolerate 
LXPort Dependency and Arms Sales
The export dependency of the rrench arras industry parallels 
the increasing dependency of brencn exports on the sales of arms 
and technology ihis dependency may be viewed from several 
perspectives ¿able 5 divides arms exports into four categories, 
including aeronautic, ground, naval, and elecronic equipment ihe 
most important component of foreign arms deliveries has been 
aircraft, helicopters and tactical missiles In 1979, these 
formed 59 percent of all deliveries, followed by ground equipment 
(28>), electronics (10 4fc), and naval materiel (2 6k) In 
preceding years, the percentage of exported aerospace equipment 
has often been higher Among the most prominent aerospace 
weapons that have been sold abroad, aside from those listed m  
1 able 1, are inrage lil, V, and F-l fighters Orders have also 
been signed for the follow-on Mirage 2000 ihe Alouette series 
of helicopters, Trance’s most successful helicopter m  foreign 
markets, antedated the Lynx, Puma, and Gazelle, currently 
produced jointly with british firms lo these helicopters the 
Super brélon, a heavy duty helicopter has also enjoyed large 
foreign sales A wide range of tactical missiles has also been 
sent to other countries anti-tank (Harpon), air-to-air (watra 
R550 and R530), air-to-surface (ASH, AS12, Lxocet AM39), and 
surface-to-surface (Exocet mM jb and h'i 40, SS10, SS11, ANO 
SS 12) Trance has assisted South Africa with the development of
¿TABLE 3
EXPORTS OF ARMS GROUPED 
BY CATEGORY 
1970-1979
( m  billions of dollars)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 19/8 1 H 1 1980
Aeronautic 324 379 607 867 873 1 166 1 697 1 832 2 393 2 849 N A
Ground 072 108 099 180 270 315 513 688 866 1 333 N A
Naval 050 016 022 092 116 196 038 175 272 127 N A
Electronic 129 257 188 299 288 498 N A
ioLal1 446 503 728 1 139 1 388 1 934 2 436 2 994 3 819 4 807 5 774
Soifrce Table 2
1 i rrors due (a) Co rounding when compared to figures m  labic 2 and (l>) Lo incompicCc 
data supplied by parliamentary reports noted in Table 2
otne Crotale surface-to-air missile ana Saudi Arabia with a 
similar version of the missile Larlicr, it assisted Israel in 
the development of the surface-to-surface Jericho missile 
Ground equipment is varied n.ey elements encompass the uX-senes 
of armor, covering heavy tanks to bridge-crossing equipment, 
armored personnel carriers, specialized transport vehicles, and 
motorized artillery i aval sales largely cover fast patrol boats 
and submarines electronic equipment for detection, guidance, 
communication and control looms increasingly important in the 
future as a source of sales as developing states increase demand 
for these items as they modernize their armed forces
if one compares the value of arras delivered to foreign 
countries to the procurement portion of the French defense budget 
(jLitle V) between 1970 and 19Ö0 it becomes clear that the trench 
arms industry is heavily export dependent In 1970, as noted m  
lable 4 arms deliveries accounted for only 14 8 percent of the 
total of arras purchases, measured by the sum of trench defense 
procurement and foreign deliveries ihis percentage steadily 
rose eetcn year to a high of 58 1 percent m  19/7 where it 
remained through 1980 Viewed from another angle, viz , the ratio 
of arms aeliveries to the defense procurement budget, arms 
transfers have progressed at a faster rate than national purchases 
of arms, including nuclear weapons lhe ratio has increased from 
1 (i (or 17 o percent) to 614 (61 4 percent) m  19/4, and has 
held steady at this level
ihis general picture is confirmed at a sectoral and firm 
level if one examines the proportion of business turnover of 
leading Irench companies that is the result of military sales,
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TABLE 4
¿ I
including foreign and domestic purchases lable 5 lists the 
percentage of business activity devoted to civilian contracts, 
irench arms purchases, and foreign military exports of trance's 
leading arsenals, firms, and nationalized corporations m  the 
arms industry for 19/d ihe industry is under tight governmental 
control and most of its units are either run by the government 
(arsenals and personnel of DOA) or controlled through public 
corporations (òwlAS, Sn l O iA, SNPL), or directed through 
government ownership of a majority share of stock (Dassault,
Matra, ihomson-brandt)
In the aerospace industry, all of the major firms depend on 
military contracts for most of their work prance's four leading 
aerospace firms are especially tied to foreign sales 
Aérospatiale (SMAS), trance's largest aerospace group, depends 
for approximately 40 percent of its activity on sales abroad, 
principally tactical missiles and ita highly successful helicopter 
industry A separate division within Aerospatiale is responsible 
for developing strategic missiles for iranee's land and sea-based 
deterrent Ihese are not for sale in 197bt Dassault, France's 
second largest firm, relied on foreign sales for almost 70 percent 
of its business turnover fhrougnout the 19/Os, more than 60 
percent of its annual production has, on the average, been for 
foreign governments SMtiiA and [»atra, the next largest 
aeronautics firms, owed 4 ƒ and percent of their business 
receipts to foreign military buyers
Other important sectors of the trench arms industry are 
similarly dependent on foreign contracts National arsenals
PABLE 5
PROPORTION OF BUSINESS TURNOVER 
OF MAJOR ARMS PRODUCERS 
DEPENDENT UPON NATIONAL 
AND FOREIGN ARMS 
PURCHASES 
(1978)
SECIOR CIVILIAN
TRENCH ARMS 
PURCHASES
MILITARY
EXPORTS
AERONAUTICS
DGA (Ministry of
Defense) — 100 —
SEP (Missile Propulsion) 40 59 1
SNECMA (aircraft motors) 17 36 47
TURBOMÉCA (air-craft motors) 47 35 18
SNIAS (helicopters, missiles
aircraft) 30 29 41
MATRA (missiles) 41 27 32
DASSAULT-BREGUEi
(fighter ancraft) 9 22 69
GROUND ARMAMENTS
DGA (Arsenals) 5 57 42 5
MANURHIN 21 19 60
LUCHAIRE 66 13 21
THOMSON-BRANDT 88 1 11
PANHARD — 1 99
NAVAL ARMAMENTS
DGA (Arsonáis) 4 91 5
CMN 3 1 96
ELECTRONICS
EMD 23 26 51
THOMSON-CST 47 18 35
1XPLOSIVLS
SNPE 36 42 22
Source Trance, Minitère de Defense, Données économiques sur les dépenses militaires 
(Paris, 1978), Chapter 8
produce over 40 percent of their work for tne military
establishments of other countries t inurhin, a high technology 
firm m  ground equipment, earns three times as much from military 
exports as from domestic arms purchases by [rench armed forces 
Panhard, a producer of motorized small armor, primarily exploits 
the international arms market Ihe electronics firm of Dassault 
exports half of its military production, and ihomson Còl, Lrance's 
principal military electronics firm, depends for a third of its 
receipts on military exports As Table i suggests, exports of 
naval vessels have lagged behind those of other arms sectors ihc 
government-run yards principally respond to lrench needs, 
including surface combatants and nuclear submarines ihe smaller 
Construction Mécanique do Normandie builds fast patrol boats, mine 
sweepers and coastal escorts, primarily for foreign purchasers 
iinally, the Socié't^ Nationale des Poudres et Lxplosives (ô WPl.) 
owes a fifth of its production to foreign contracts
ihe arros industry employs approximately d00,000 military and 
civilian personnel ihis comprises about 1 d percent of the 
active population and 5 5 of the national labor force ihere may 
be as many as one million workers inairectly related to arms 
production, if the remarks cited above, of Defense Minister 
Charles Hernu are given credence Ihose directly involved in arms 
manufacture may be divided into the following groups 
DGA (ground and naval
arsenals tl,000
Atomic energy Commission 12,000
Aeronautic industry 00,000
Llectronic industry 42,000
Diverse industry (mechanic,
explosives,etc ) 00,000
Personnel engaged in exports is officially estimated at 
approximately 10d,000 ihis estimate would appear to be low
in light of the increasing dependency of the arms industry on 
exports A more realistic figure would be around 1^0,000-140,000 
Arras plants and laboratories are spread throughout the country 
Approximately 40 percent are found m  the Paris region lhe 
others are distributed along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts 
as well as m  the southwestern and southeastern regions of the 
nation lor historical reasons, the northeast, traditional route 
of foreign invasions, has little in the way of a developed arms 
industry
Despite the success of the Trench arms industry in exporting 
arms, it still faces an uncertain future Much depends on its 
aoility to keep pace with rapid technological changes and to meet 
rising competition for sales from tne superpowers, other European 
states, and, increasingly, the developing world Israel, brazil, 
India, and Argentina, for example, have become important arms 
suppliers Like Trance, these states have few political 
inhibitions about selling abroad Lven small states, like 
Singapore, are developing selected markets where their specialized 
capabilities give them an edge
branee's future as an arms exporter hinges then on its 
research and development effort and whether it will be able to 
develop new, militarily effective and economically competitive
arms During the 1970s, spending for military R and D, measured 
in constant 1959 francs climbed very slowly, rising approximately 
20 percent from 1972 to 19/9 ¿0 bincc 19 79 , funds earmarked for 
R and D have increased another 20 percent, partly m  response to 
criticism within the defense industry that sufficient funds were 
not being allocated to keep the industry abreast of its 
competitors A confidential evaluation written by an inspector 
de finances reportedly complained that investment in the arms 
industry was stagnating ihe state neither allocated sufficient 
funding nor did private firms plow back guaranteed earnings into 
research development, preferring that the government foot the 
Dili for such expenditureo ihe problem is now generally 
understood within the government ihe natlocalization of much oi 
the arms industry by the Socialist regime also affords the 
government the possibility of mobilizing needed funds for high 
priority research and development projects Whether enough 
will be available to meet rising demands for the modernization of 
L rench armed forces and the competitive demands of international 
trade remains an open question ihe Irench military is pressing 
to increase spending for a wide range of programs ihese include 
a seventh nuclear submarine of advanced design, a new, mobile 
nuclear land-based system, lasers, satclljte and launch
Q -technology, and a neutron bomb ueanwhile, unemployment i** at 
record peaks rrench competiveness m  world markets is slipping 
While a 20 percent devaluation of the franc makes lrench goods, 
including arms more attractive, inflation and higher labor costs 
are offsetting this transitional advantage, and the cost oí goods
that I rance raust buy, especially oil, is rising rapidly i ranee 
must meet its military needs within a constraining economic 
environment Hard choices lie ahead and it is by no means certain 
that security and economic imperatives can be addressed 
successfully or that arms transfers can be pusned much further 
than they are now to relax the choice-, facing the government
Sales of arms and military technology are critical to the 
rench economy from several perspectives lhey assure employment 
for d00,000 workers, many of whom are highly trained personnel 
directly engaged in arms research, development, and production 
Lxports are critical to full employment within the industry ihcy 
permit more efficient series runs Whatever their inconveniences 
for lrench armed forces, including delayed deliveries in favor of 
foreign purchasers, they hold unit costs down, permitting larger 
purchases of arms and equipment than might otherwise be possible 
m e y  also contribute to trance's balance of payments position and 
help to recycle funds needed to pay for large oil purchases to 
keep the trench economy running
ihese benefits have largely been accepted as part of trench 
doctrine by successive trench governments questions such as whether 
greater profits and welfare could have been generated through civilian 
investment or whether the arras industry is run efficiently have not 
been openly addressed or debated lhe Right and the Left are agreed on 
the need for an autonomous arms industry directed by the central 
government lhe recent nationalizations of the Socialist government 
affirmed these principles on taking office lhere is also wide public
¿b
and partisan support for continued high levels ol arras exports 1 he 
economic pressures arising from the civilian economy and the 
constraints imposed on investment, employment, and reallocations weaken 
further what little incentive there is to examine seriously the 
possibility of decreased investment in the arras industry It remains 
to be seen whether nationalization and the expanded bureaucracy that it 
implies will lead to greater efficiency and more mobilizable capital 
In any event, major changes in size and export orientation of the 
trench arms industry are not likely in the immediate future
LI
FOOTNOluS
1 See remarks of trancois Mitterrand, Le Monde, December 14-lb,
19// "i or the limitation of [armsj sales, the common program [oí the 
Socialist and Communist partiesj has progressively envisioned a 
dacoman measure the cessation of any sale of arms and war materials 
to colonial, racist, or fascist governments South Africa, Chile, 
brazil, Argentina will be among the first proscribed lhe Socialists u
of the opinion that a reorientation of sales should equally be rapidly 
undertaken " brazil and Argentina no longer fall under a Socialist 
embargo, nor has there been a reorientation of the arras trade under the
1 itterrand government
2 Lc ijondc r September 1, 19/4
j Country figures are drawn from SiPftl, Arms trade Register?.
(Cambridge hll Press, 19/3), HASSID and annual S1PR1 Yearbooks 
o« Mac Ad Armaments and Disarmaments 19/s-lQ8o Based on figures 
presented in xable 2 below
4 trance, Assemblee Nationale, Commission ce la Defense 
Nationale et des torces Armées, (1981) Avis sur le oroiet de loi 
ds., f J.nancss- p.0ur 1982, ho 473, Défense. Politique de Défense
— iLâ—France, P 120 Exchange rate drawn from figures supplied by the
International i onetary l und, with the irane quoted at 4 2260 for 
19Ö0
5 See the author's "trance and the Arms Trade," International 
Affairs, January, 19Ö0, pp 5^-72
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